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PRESU-MPTIONS
EDMUND

M.

MORGAN*

Every writer of sufficient intelligence to appreciate the difficulties of the subject-matter has approached the topic of presumptions with a sense of hopelessness and has left it with a feeling
of despair. The great Thayer attempted to bring order out of
chaos by reducing the entire doctrine to a simple formula, for
which he had very little authority in the judicial decisions, and
which for a long time received no real judicial sanction but which
later received much lip-service and recently has been rigorously
applied in a few cases. Wigmore has'been content to accept Thayer
almost without qualification. Both these distinguished scholars
exclude from the field of presumptions two classes of case in which
the terminology of presumptions is frequently used. First, conclusive presumptions. It is too clear for argument that a so-called
conclusive presumption is only a form: of expression for a positive
rule of law. "Given A, B is conclusively presumed", can mean
nothing more than that the courts will attach to A all the legal
consequences that they attach to B. Thus, to say that twenty years'
adverse possession of a tract of land raises a conclusive presumption of a lost grant to the possessor or his predecessor is really to
say that such adverse possession gives title to the adverse possessor.
Legislation framed in terms of conclusive presumptions would
seem to call for the same sort of interpretation; but frequently
the courts feel constrained to pursue a different technique. For
example, the statute involved in Heiner v. Donnan, which created
a presumption that every gift made within two years of the donor's
death was made in contemplation of death, would appear merely
to put in the same class for taxation gifts made in contemplation
of death and gifts made within two years of death. This seems
so obvious as hardly to merit mention. But the majority of the
Supreme Court spent the greater part of its opinion in determining that the statute should not be construed to apply to fully
executed gifts inter vivos and that Congress had no power to deny
*Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. This is the concluding article
of the series.
1285 U. S. 312, 322, 52 S. Ct. 358 (1932).
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to the representatives of the estate of a decedent "the right to
show by competent evidence that a gift made within two years
prior to the death of the decedent was in fact not made in contemplation of death". Such a course often obscures the real question, and leads to entirely unnecessary complexities. It always
emphasizes phraseology at the expense of substance.2
The second class excluded deserves more attention. Here if A
is given, the trier of fact may find B. This is frequently said to be
illustrated by cases involving the doctrine, res ipsa loquitur; and
correctly so, if it be conceded that such cases are more than applications of the rule which makes negligence a question for the jury
where reasonable men could on the facts reach different conclusions. If it be granted that in these cases the courts allow the
jury to give an artificial effect to the fact of the accident, then, as
some judges and commentators say, the happening of the accident
raises a presumption of negligence. And they do not mean merely
that such happening logically justifies an inference of negligence,
but that the trier is permitted to draw an inference or come to a
conclusion which the application of ordinary rules of logic or the
application of generalizations drawn from that segment of ordinary human experience known to the courts would not permit.
Fortunately, cases of this class have not caused much confusion of
judicial thought, for there has been no attempt to determine just
how long this artificial effect endures. The courts have generally
said that when the proponent has introduced evidence sufficient to
justify a jury in finding fact A (the accident) and the jury has
found A, it may find B (the negligence) unless the opponent's
evidence of no B (due care) is so heavy as to require a directed
verdict. Where this sort of artificial effect is created by statute,
the question usually discussed is its constitutionality. If the basic
fact, A, has no logical connection with the fact to be found, B,
then to permit the jury to find B is to permit it to make a purely
arbitrary finding and is to deny due process of law.4 If there is
'Cf. Mr. Justice Holmes in Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U. S. 88, 95, 48 S. Ct.
443 (1928): "But the essential thing is that, whether in a roundabout
or a perfectly natural way, the statute has said if you take the office you
must take the consequences of knowledge whether you have it or not."
See also James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Company v. Harry, 273 U. S. 119,
47 3S. Ct. 308 (1926).
See Prosser, The Procefural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 MIN. L.
REV. 241 (1936), contending that the doctrine properly understood does
not authorize the trier to give any artificial effect to the evidence.
'See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219, 31 S. Ct. 145 (1911). At p.
235 Mr. Justice Hughes points out that it is fatal to the constitutionality
of a provision that it permits a jury to find intent to defraud from a
mere breach of contract. The same reasons seem to lie back of the decision
in Western & Atlantic Railroad Company v. Henderson, 279 U. S. 639,
49 S. Ct. 445 (1929).
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such a logical connection, it matters not that, according to previous
judicial determinations, the probative value of A was not enough
to justify a finding of B. The legislature is entitled to give it an'
added weight.'
Thayer, Wigmore, and their disciples use presumption in a
more restricted sense: Given the existence of A, the existence of B
must be assumed. A is the basic fact, B is the presumed fact.
Whether the presumption is the legal process by which this result
is obtained or the term by which the rule stating the result is
known, or just what part of the process, or result, or rule it does
designate, is the subject of a lot of obscure and obscuring phraseology in which it is difficult if not impossible to discover either
sense or utility. But to avoid confusion, it is well ordinarily to
speak of the basic fact and the presumed fact rather than of the
presumption. At the outset, it is to be noticed that it is not the
mere introduction of evidence of the existence of A that compels
the trier to assume the existence of B. A must be established, that
is, taken to exist for the purposes of the action. It mnay be established becausejudieially known, or admitted in the pleadings, or
conceded by stipulation in open court, or proved by evidence of
such weight as to cause the judge to direct the jury to find it, or
found by the jury on conflicting evidence. Now, if A is established
in such a way that the existence of B must be assumed, to what
extent does this assumption impose a burden upon the opponent?
First, is the burden to be the same wherever any presumption
operates? MYr. Thayer and Mr. Wigmore answer positively, "Yes."
If in a particular instance there seems to be a deviation from this
rule, it is due to something other than the presumption. Just what
that thing is, and why it grows out of the very situation which
calls the presumption into being, they do not make clear. They.
both concede that different considerations call different presumptions into existence. (1) Some are designed to expedite the trial
by relieving a party from introducing evidence upon issues which
may not be litigated. For example, why- does a court which puts
upon the prosecution the burden of proving a defendant's sanity
beyond a reasonable doubt, at the same time give the prosecution
the benefit of a presumption of sanity? Simply to avoid the waste
of time and effort required to take evidence on an issue which,
aside from statute, is raised by the plea of not guilty but in
'Yee Hen v. United States, 268 U. S. 178, 185, 45 S. Ct. 470 (1924);
Wooten v. State, 24 Fla. 335 (1888). See Morgan, Federal Constitutionaw
Limitations Upon Presumptions Created by State Legiszation, in HARVARD
LEGAL ESSAYs, written in honor of and presented to Joseph Henry Beale
and Samuel Williston, 323-356 (1934).
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most cases will not be raised by evidence. The defendant must at
least show that the question raised by the pleadings is to be litigated in the evidence. (2) In some cases a presumption may be
necessary to avoid a procedural impasse. Where a court has a
fund to be distributed, and the determination of the rights of
conflicting claimants depends upon the date of the death of X,
it may be established that X disappeared more than seven years
before action was brought; this raises a presumption of his death,
but by the orthodox view raises no presumption as to the date of
death. If he died soon after his disappearance, A will take. If he
died between four and six years after his disappearance, B will
take; if later, C will take. In the absence of evidence and of any
presumption as to date of death, the court simply cannot decide
the case. This has led some courts to raise a presumption of death
on the last instant of the seventh year. (3) Some presumptions
are based upon a preponderance of probability. Indeed, -Mr. Justice Holmes once said that all true presumptions have such a
foundation.6 To save time, it is well for the court to compel the
trier of fact to assume the usual and to require the party relying
upon the unusual to show that he has at least enough evidence to
make its existence reasonably probable. (4) In some instances
there will be the added element of difficulty in securing legally
competent evidence in cases of the particular class. This is exemplified in the common law rule that a long continued exercise of
what would be a right if properly originated raises a presumption
of a legally created right. (5) Another group of presumptions owe
their origin to the fact that one of the parties has peculiar means
of access to the evidence or peculiar knowledge of the facts. For
example, at common law, where freight is delivered in good order
to an initial carrier and is delivered in bad order to the consignee
by the terminal carrier, although it may have been transported
over the lines of several connecting carriers, the presumption is
that the damage was done by the terminal carrier. Here, there is
no procedural convenience or preponderance of probability or general inaccessibility of evidence to call forth the presumption, but
as between consignee and carrier, the last carrier has peculiar
means of access to the facts. (6) Again, many presumptions ex'Greer v. United States, 245 U. S. 559, 561, 38 S. Ct. 209 (1918): "A
presumption upon a matter of fact, when it is not merely a disguise for
some other principle, means that common experience shows the fact to
be so generally true that courts may notice the truth." Compare, at the
opposite extreme Judge Learned Hand in Alpine Forwarding Company v.
Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 60 F. (2d) 734, 736 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932):
"Plainly, if the evidence which raises the presumption made a conclusion
in the bailor's favor rationally permissible, there would be no need for
it at all; its existence presupposes the opposite."
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press the result that the courts creating them deem socially desirable. This causes such courts to require the trier to assume the
existence of that result in the absence of any showing to the contrary. The stock illustration has already been given, namely, that
a right enjoyed by usage for a long period is presumed to have
had a legal origin. That the judicial conviction of social desirability was the chief reason for this presumption is shown by its
evolution from a mere inference through a presumption to a hard
and fast rule of law which gives to adverse possession for the
prescribed period the effect of creating a new title. (7) Finally,
many, if not most, of the generally recognized presumptions are
supported by two or more of the foregoing. The presumption that
a child born in wedlock is the legitimate child of the husband, for
instance, is supported by a heavy preponderance of probability,
by the consideration of difficulty in producing legally competent
evidence of the paternity of a child born to a married woman, and
by considerations of policy predicated upon a society in which the
family is the fundamental unit, the institution by which the devolution of property is determined, and as to the intimate aspects
of which accepted notions of decency and propriety demand a
discreet secrecy.
In view of the different reasons which have caused the creation
of the different presumptions, why should each be given the same
effect as all others? Why isn't the Connecticut court right when
it says: "No general rule can, however, be laid down as to the
effect of a particular presumption in the actual trial of a case,
7
for this depends upon the purpose it is designed to serve?"1
8
9
Vermont and Alabama have said that presumptions should be
classified. Each of them suggests only two classes; one of which
most courts declare to be founded in error. Connecticut alone has
attempted a comprehensive classification. All courts do give unusual effect to some presumptions; but most of them assume with
Thayer and Wigmore that all presumptions should be treated alike.
Just what is that treatment? It seems to be of some seven'different
varieties.
The first, which gives a presumption the least procedural effect, is Thayer's view. When A is established, the jury must fnd
B unless the opponent introduces evidence from which a jury might
reasonably find the non-existence of B. To put it generally, the
presumption operates to place upon the opponent the burden of

'O'Dea v. Aniodeo, 118 Conn. 58, 60, 170 Atl. 486 (1934).

'See Sheldon v. Wright, 80 Vt. 298, 67 Atl. 807 (1907).
'Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Maddox, 221 Ala. 292, 128 So. 383
(1930).
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introducing relevant and competent evidence of such quantity and
quality as would justify a jury in finding the non-existence of B;
in other words, sufficient evidence to make the non-existence of B
a question for the jury. This, and this alone, Thayer says, is the
"characteristic and essential work of the presumption". While his
formula has been stated in many cases for many years, it is only
recently that it has been applied with effect. In McIver v.
Schwartz, 0 a Rhode Island case, decided in 1929, plaintiff's property was injured by the negligent operation of an automobile
owned by defendant and driven by one Riley. Defendant testified
that Riley, while authorized to drive the automobile for business
purposes, was at the time, contrary to orders, driving it to Riley's
home during the lunch hour for his own purposes. Riley, though
in the court room, was not called as a witness. Plaintiff put in
no direct evidence of Riley's authority. The trial judge submitted
to the jury the question of Riley's authority, and they found for
plaintiff. By the law of Rhode Island evidence of ownership of
an automobile and operation thereof by a person in the general
employ of the owner is not enough, of itself, to justify a finding
that the operation was in the scope of the operator's employment.
On appeal, plaintiff conceded this, but insisted that upon the facts
of such ownership, employment and operation, a presumption was
raised of operation within the scope of the employment. So much
the Supreme Court granted. It held, however, that since a jury
might reasonably have believed defendant's evidence, the mere
introduction of it destroyed the presumption and left the plaintiff
without sufficient evidence to get to the jury. Plaintiff was relying
upon the presumption; the presumption put on the defendant only
the burden of producing sufficient evidence to avoid a directed
verdict; this burden he sustained by introducing his own testimony; and his failure to call Riley could not operate as affirmative
evidence against him, although it might induce a disbelief of his
testimony. But such disbelief by the jury and the trial judge
could not save the presumption. By this view the presumption
operates only as a guide to the judge in passing upon a motion
for a directed verdict as to the existence or non-existence of the
presumed fact. If the basic fact has not sufficient logical value
to justify an inference of the existence of the presumed fact, the
mere introduction of the opposing evidence requires a direction
of a finding of its non-existence; if the basic fact does have sufficient logical value to justify such an inference, the introduction
of the opposing evidence will destroy the presumption, but, of
"50 R. I. 68, 145 AtI. 101 (1929).
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course, it will not operate to strike out, the evidence of the basic
fact or prevent the jury from giving to it such value as human
experience assigns to it. In short, the introduction of evidence of
the non-existence of the presued fact leaves the case exactly as
if no presumption had ever arisen.
This distinctly is not the present view of the Washington court.
Just how much additional effect it gives a presumption is not quite
clear. It certainly belongs with that group which make it absolutely plain that a presumption is not destroyed by the mere
introduction of sufficient evidence to avoid a directed verdict.
Where only evidence of that quantity and quality has been introduced, the jury has a function to perform. In this group three
different ideas have emerged. One of them has been plainly articulated in Michigan," less plainly in Connecticut ;12 but it is more
than doubtful whether either of these states would now adhere to
their former pronouncements. This view gives to the presumption an operation only slightly stronger than Thayer's doctrine.
When evidence sufficient to avoid a directed verdict is introduced,
it suspends the operation of the presumption while the jury
considers the evidence. If it positively disbelieves so much of the
evidence that the balance would be insufficient to avoid a directed
verdict, the -presumption then comes back into operation. As
stated, this means that the mere introduction of the evidence destroys the presumption unless the jury positively disbelieves the
evidence. The jury's disbelief, in other words, makes that evidence
as if it had never been received.' 3 So far as helping solve the
issue, the opponent might as well have offered no evidence, for its
rejection by the jury is as effective as a ruling of inadmissibility
by the judge.
Another possible interpretation of the Connecticut and Michigan
language is that the presumption does not cease to operate unless
the jury positively believes the opposing evidence. The introduction of the requisite evidence may suspend the presumption while
the jury is considering it. If the jury positively believes the evidence, the suspension is permanent; otherwise the presumption
"Gillett v. Michigan United Traction Co., 205 Mich. 410, 421, 171 N. W.
536 (1919).
UClark v.Diefendorf, 109 Conn. 507, 510, 147 Atl. 33 (1929).
131n Patt v. Dilley, 273 Mich. 601, 263 N. W. 749 (1935), the court said:
"Presumptions disappear when the facts appear. The facts appear when
the evidence is introduced from which the facts may be found. Presumptions cannot be weighed against evidence for they fade out in the
light of evidence, no matter how contradictory the evidence." This, of
course, is directly opposed to the text, which states the court's dictum
in the Gillett case. The O'Dea case, note 7, supra, casts doubt upon the
interpretation given in the text of the Clark case, note 12, supra.
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becomes operative again. Here the idea is that the opponent has
not advanced the inquiry to any helpful extent until he has introduced evidence believed by the trier which would justify a reasonable jury in finding against the presumed fact.
It will be noted that in neither of these two ideas is the jury's
finding as to the presumed fact necessarily involved. Their attention is directed only to belief or disbelief of a certain quantum of
evidence. If the jurors believe circumstantial evidence which
would justify any jury in finding against the presumed fact, it is
immaterial that the evidence would not lead them' so to find. Even
if they expressly refuse to find against the presumed fact, the presumption is destroyed. Perhaps an example will make it understandable. Suppose an action brought upon a life insurance policy
in a jurisdiction where seven years unexplained absence raises a
presumption of death. Suppose further that such absence of A,
the assured, is established and that there is no other evidence of
A's death. The defendant calls W, who testifies that just a year
before the trial, in a distant city he saw a man, going by the same
surname as A, whose handwriting was similar, whose voice was
similar, whose features were similar except for a scar that somewhat distorted his mouth, but who refused to admit any knowledge
of facts which would have been known to A. Obviously this is circumstantial evidence from which a jury could find that the man
described by W was A, the missing man, and hence that A was
alive at the time of action brought, but it would not require such
a finding even if believed. Assume three questions put to the
jury and answered as follows: (1) Do you believe that W saw
such a man as he described? No. (2) Do you believe that W
did not see such a man as he described? No. (3) Do you believe
that A was dead at the time when, according to W's testimony, W
saw the man he described? Yes. Assume in addition that the seven
years' absence would not of itself logically justify the inference of
death. By Thayer's view there would be a directed verdict for
the defendant. By the first interpretation of the second view, there
would likewise be a directed verdict for the defendant, for the
jury did not positively disbelieve W's testimony, that is, it did
not positively disbelieve that W saw such a person as he described;
and it is entirely immaterial what the jury finds or believes as to
the presumed fact. By the second interpretation, the presumption would persist, and the proponent would win; but if the jury
answered that they believed W did see such a man but the man
was not A, the presumption would be gone and a verdict would be
directed for the defendant, since the jury did believe that the fact
to which W testified did exist, and that fact was evidence from
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which a jury might have found against the presumed fact. Nothing
further is necessary to destroy the presumption.
The third idea expressed in this second group leaves the
effect of the opposing evidence less clearly defined. The New York
Court of Appeals has said: "The presumption . . . remains only
so long as there is no substantial evidence to the contrary." In
applying this to a case where a son had injured the plaintiff in
New York City and the father testified that the son's authority to
drive the father's car was restricted to Long Island, the court,
spealdng of this testimony said: "It is not corroborated in any
way, and the interest of the witness and the character of the
evidence might, not unreasonably, lead to doubt of its truth, even
though not contradicted . . . 'This evidence was not sufficient in
law to destroy the presumption of control, although it might have
been in fact.' "1'1 The Washington Supreme Court has on occasion used similar language. 5 This seems to mean that if the jury
might reasonably disbelieve the evidence against the presumed fact,
they are at liberty to do so. Does it go so far as to say that the
presumption is destroyed only where the positive evidence against
the presumed fact is such that applying ordinary rules the judge
would be obliged to direct a verdict that the presumed fact did not
exist?
The next view, which finds application and expression in Ohio
and California cases, definitely puts upon the opponent a burden
which directly affects the presumed fact.18 When A is established,
the jury must assume that B exists, and it must so find unless the
evidence tending to prove the non-existence of B is such as to
convince the jury that the non-existence of B is either as probable
as its existence or more probable than its existence. It is said'
that the opponent need not overcome the presumption but must
meet or balance it. This does not put the burden of persuasion
on the opponent; it does put on him the burden of seeing to it
that there is in the case sufficient evidence to put the mind of
the jury in equilibrium upon the issue. Thus, if we assume that
A is established and that there is no evidence in the case, aside
from A, which tends to prove the non-existence of B, the opponent
has not only the burden of producing evidence from which the
jury can find that B does not exist, but also the burden of con-

"Chaika v. Vandenberg, 252 N. Y. 101, 104-105, 169 N. E. 103 (1929).
25See Babbitt v. Seattle School District No. 1, 100 Wash. 392, 170 Pac.
1020 (1918).
"See Diller v. Northern California Power Co., 162 Cal. 531, 536, 123
Pac. 359 (1912); Klunk v. Hocking Valley Railway Co., 74 Oh. St. 125,
133, 77 N. E. 752 (1906).
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vincing them that his proposition is at least as likely to be true
as is the proponent's proposition that B exists.
Still another view is thought by the Connecticut court to be
proper in cases where the presumption is created because the opponent has peculiar knowledge of the facts or peculiar access to
the evidences of them. It was first advocated by Professor Bohlen
of the University of Pennsylvania.17 In a case where plaintiff, a
passenger on a railway train, is suing for injuries caused by a
derailment of the carriage in which he was riding, some courts
hold that when the derailment is established, negligence of the
railway company is presumed. To overcome such a presumption,
Mr. Bohlen suggests, the railway company has the burden of showing the facts which constituted its conduct as to all matters connected with the derailment. For example, the condition of the
roadbed and rolling stock, the inspections made thereof, the speed
of the train and other items pertinent to its operation; these the
defendant must convince the jury were as the defendant contends.
If as to any one of them the jury's mind is in equilibrium, its finding as to that item must be against the company. When once all
these pertinent facts are established, the further question whether
such facts constitute due care or negligence will be for the jury
unless reasonable men could not differ in judgment. Upon this
further question the burden will be where it was when the case
started, upon the plaintiff. The theory is that the railway company
knows or has peculiarly effective means of finding out the condition of all its equipment and the conduct of all its employeesjust what happened. Consequently, it should make those things
known to the jury; insofar as it fails so to do, the jury must
assume them against the company. But the company has no peculiar access to evidence or other means which will help the jury
in establishing a standard of due care and in using it when
established as a measure of the conduct of the company. There is
nothing in the fact of derailment which should change the original
burden upon this particular matter. The Connecticut court applied
the same rule to the presumption that a car operated by a member
of the family was being operated as a family car. It said, ".

.

. the

presumption shall avail the plaintiff until such time as the trier
finds proven the circumstances of the situation with reference to
the use made of the car and the authority of the person operating
it to drive it, leaving the burden then on the plaintiff to establish,

"7See Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the
OF PA. L. REV. 307 (1920), reprinted in BOHLEN,
STUDIES IN TuL LAW OF TORTS 636 (1926).

Burden of Proof, 68 U.
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in view of the facts so found, that the car was being operated at
the time as a family-car." 18
The Pennsylvania courts in almost all cases, all courts in dealing
with the presumption of legitimacy of a child born in wedlock, and
some courts in certain other cases including some involving res
ipsa loquitur, go still further. They hold that the presumption
operates to put the burden upon the opponent of persuading the
jury that the presumed fact does not exist.1 9 This is squarely in
the teeth of the dogma that the burden of proof, in the sense of
burden of persuasion, never shifts. Some opinions try to make
an explanation that will avoid the dogma, but they are highly
unsuccessful'

20 o

As if the foregoing variety were not enough, some courts go
further. They first decide whether the presumption requires the
opponent to produce sufficient evidence to avoid a directed verdict,
or (2) both to produce it and to persuade the jury to believe or
disbelieve it, or (3) to produce substantial evidence (whatever
that means), or (4) to balance the presumption, or (5) to persuade
the jury that the presumed fact does not exist. Then, they go on
to say that in considering the evidence upon the question of the
existence or non-existence of the presumed fact, the jury must
also consider the presumption with the other evidence or in connection with the evidence. Massachusetts has phrased it in numerous ways, most of which say that the presumption is not evidence
but must be weighed with the evidence. 21 Judge Parker of the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals said of the presumption of innocence: "And, as it is a presumption of law to be considered by
the jury, although not strictly evidence, it is in the nature of evidence in favor of the accused."122 Such a presumption has evidentiary force in Alabama ;28 and in Vermont 24 it has been held
reversible error to refuse to charge that the presumption of inno"'O'Dea v. Amodeo, note 7, supra, at pp. 65-66.
"See e. g. Holzheimer v. Lit Brothers, 262 Pa. 150, 152-154, 105 Atl.
73 (1918); Saunders v. Fredette, 84 N. H. 414, 151 AtI. 820 (1930); Weber
v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co., 175 Ia. 358, 151 N. W.
862 (1916).
"See Donovan v. St. Joseph's Home, 295 Ill. 125, 129-132, 129 N. E.
1 (1920).
OSee Commonwealth v. Spencer, 212 Mass. 438, 99 N. E. 266 (1912);
Commonwealth v. De Francesco, 248 Mass. 9, 142 N. E. 749 (1924);
Taylor v. Creeley, 257 Mass. 21, 152 N. E. 3 (1926); Wilson v. Grace, 273
Mass. 146, 153; 173 N. E. 524 (1930); Commonwealth v. Clark, 198 N. E.
641, 645 (Mass., 1935). (Mr. Justice Lummus interprets the former cases
as meaning that "the rational probability on which the presumption
rests" may be weighed with the evidence.)
"Dodson v. United States, 23 F. (2d) 401, 402 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928).
mNote 9, supra.
"Clark v. Demars, 102 Vt. 147, 146 Atl. 812 (1929).
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cence is evidence in favor of a defendant charged with a violation of a traffic statute. The California Code of Civil Procedure,
copied in Montana, North Dakota, and Oregon, classifies presumptions as a species of evidence ;25 and there is many a California
case where, but for the evidential effect of the presumption, there
would have been a directed verdict against the party in whose
favor the presumption operated. In Smellie v. Southern Pacific
C0.26 the Court said: "That a presumption is evidence and may
in certain cases outweigh positive evidence adduced against it has
long been the settled law of this state." Indeed, Sec. 2061 of the
Code provides that jurors are "not bound to decide in conformity
with the declarations of any number of witnesses, which do not
produce conviction in their minds, against a less number or against
a presumption or other evidence satisfying their minds." Although some judges have sought to limit or overthrow this concept,
it seems still to stand as law in California.
Which, if any, of these varying views does the Washington
court adopt? Although opinions can be found in which the Thayer
formula is stated with approval, no decision, it is believed, turns
upon its application. Moreover, there are scores of cases which
cannot be reconciled with it. In Babbitt v. Seattle School District
No. 1,27 the court said: "The presumption growing out of a prima
facie case, established by proof of the injury, and the ownership
of the motorcycle, and the use thereof by an employee of the
owner of the motorcycle, subsisted only so long as there was no
substantial evidence to the contrary. When that was offered, the
presumption disappeared, unless met by further proof." In holding the presumption overcome, the court pointed out that the evidence, that the employee's use of the motorcycle was solely for his
own purpose, was given by the defendant's officers and by the
employee and was not contradicted. It declared the employee to
be a disinterested witness. Six months later it explained this decision by saying that "there were no disputed facts for the jury
to decide".'28 In Feldtnan v. Russak29 the same presumption was
said to have been dissipated as a matter of law by undisputed
evidence that the accident occurred after working hours and uncontradicted testimony that the vehicle was being used by the
employee outside the scope of his authority. It was given by the
"CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. (Deering, 1927) §§1957, 1959, 1963; MONT. REV.
CODE (Choate, 1921) §§10600, 10602, 10606; N. D. ComP. LAWS. ANN. (1913)

§§7934, 7936; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930)

§§9-801, 9-803, 9-807.

2212 Cal. 540, 549, 299 Pac. 529 (1931).
"100 Wash. 392, 170 Pac. 1020 (1918).
"IMoore v. Roddie, 103 Wash. 386, 389, 174 Pac. 648 (1918).
'141 Wash. 287, 290, 251 Pac. 572 (1926).
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employer and employee and was corroborated by another employee,
by a former foreman and by a totally disinterested witness. The
opinion contains this passage: "But this primofaoie case rests
upon a presumption that only exists until the respondents have
made a prima facie defense . . . In order for the respondents,
however, to establish their prima facie case of lack of responsibility
to such an extent that the court can take the matter away from the
jury, this court has said that respondents must establish the state
of facts for which they contend by the testimony of disinterested
witnesses; that where the testimony that the employe was not at
the time engaged in the employer's business comes only from the
employe and the employer, such testimony is not sufficient to take
the case from the jury, but that there remains a question for the
jury to decide, it being permitted to'disregard the testimony of
such interested witnesses and to find the fact to be that the
employe was at the time on the employer's business. But Wherever
it has appeared that the testimony of interested witnesses has been
corroborated and the testimony has not been refuted, then, as *
matter of law, the court has decided that the presumption in
favor of the appellant has been overcome, and that a directed
verdict in favor of the employer should be made." In the Barach
case,30 which involved this same presumption, the defendant insisted that the evidence showed without substantial dispute that
the employee-was operating defendant's truck solely for his individual purposes. The court, however, sustained a verdict for plaintiff, saying:
"It is true that appellants relied upon the presumption flowing
from the ownershil and general use of the truck, and equally true
that the driver testified squarely against that presumption, but
he was an interested witness....
"It is contended, however, that the driver was corroborated. To
some extent he was . . . but if the jury believed all this, still
they would have to believe, in addition, the unsupported and uncorroborated statement of the driver that he had no business for
the respondent in that direction at that time, and that he drove
from its office toward the ferry landing solely on his personal

affairs.

'31

In all of these cases, the court was dealing with direct evidence
in positive denial of the presumed fact: it was not called upon to
discuss the effect of circumstantial evidence, evidence establishing

3'Barach v. Island Empire Tel. & Tel. Co., 151 Wash. 279, 275 Pac.
713 (1929).
"At pp. 285, 286.
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facts from which the non-existence of the presumed fact might
reasonably be inferred. In the Reinhart case, 2 however, the court
seems to have had to face that question. In speaking of the presumption that "one killed in an accident was at the time in the
exercise of due care" it said: "The presumption of due care may
be overcome by the direct testimony of disinterested witnesses, but
it is not overcome by the testimony of interested witnesses, or from
inferences that may be drawn from circumstantial facts." In
Smith v. Seattle 3 the trial court had charged the jury that this
"presumption of due care was not evidence, but would serve in
the place of evidence until prima facie evidence had been introduced by the opposite party, and that the presumption of due
care would not be overcome by the testimony of interested witnesses or from inferences which might be drawn from circumstantial facts." An assignment of error based on this instruction was
thus dealt with on appeal: "That instruction was in exact accord
with the rule stated in Reinhart v. Oregon-Washington R. & N.
Co., 174 Wash. 320, 24 P. (2d) 615. This appears to be recognized
by the appellant, but it says that the instruction is not a correct
statement of the law. The rule of the Reinhart case was not improvidently stated, but was written after due consideration. We
think that the rule is a sound and just one, and it is adhered to."
If these decisions are to be relied upon, several things seem
abundantly clear: (1) A presumption is not destroyed by the
mere introduction of evidence of the non-existence of the presumed
fact which would be sufficient to avoid a directed verdict on that
issue. (2) It is not destroyed by direct testimony of the non-existence of the presumed fact given by interested witnesses. The reason stated is that the jury might well refuse to believe them. It
must follow that if a disinterested witness were so impeached as
to justify a jury in disbelieving him, his testimony would be no
more effective than that of an interested witness. (3) A presumption is not destroyed by undisputed testimony from disinterested unimpeached witnesses of the existence of facts from
which the non-existence of the presumed fact may reasonably be
inferred. If the language of the opinions be taken at face value,
it is likewise clear that a presumption is destroyed by direct, uncontradicted testimony of the non-existence of the presumed fact
given by a disinterested and unimpeached witness. Is this because the court is convinced that no jury could reasonably refuse
"Reinhart v. Oregon-Washington Railroad & Navigation Co., 174 Wash.
320, 324, 24 P. (2d)

615 (1933).

3178 Wash. 477, 480, 480-481, 35 P. (2d) 27 (1934).
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to believe such testimony? In other words, if the opponent, with
the burden of establishing the non-existence of the presumed fact
had introduced this same evidence, could the court have properly
directed a verdict for him ? That is to ask, are these courts merely
applying the rule, adopted by a large number of courts, that a
jury must believe the testimony of a witness who is disinterested,
unimpeached, uncontradicted, and tells an inherently probable
story? In most of the Washington cases the result would harmonize with this theory; but the language, "substantial evidence",
is not that ordinarily used in describing the situation for a directed
verdict. And it would not be unreasonable to deduce from them
that the presumption is destroyed by the introduction of evidence
in opposition which is credible and comes from disinterested and
unimpeached witnesses, even though a jury might disbelieve it.
4
are right, however, this deIf the majority in Karp v. Herder,"
duction is incorrect. There, Mrs. Karp was killed in an automobile
accident. A disinterested witness, Hoare, testified that he saw her
enter the Olympic Highway without stopping. If this was true,
she was guilty of negligence as a matter'of law, in not yielding
the right of way to the defendant. The majority stated that there
were some features of Hoare's testimony which did not seem
plausible. Although he was disinterested, unimpeached, and uncontradicted, the court said: "Whether this story was true, partially true, or false, was for the jury, and not the court, to say."
They held it did not destroy the presumption. And in La Puente
v. Seattle Times,35 the court took the same position. In an action
for libel three witnesses for defendant testified to plaintiff's bad
reputation; no witness testified to the contrary. The trial judge
charged the jury that plaintiff was presumed to have a good reputation and need not offer evidence in support of it. The Supreme
Court pointed out that the "quantum and quality of proof sufficient to rebut a presumption differs widely in different cases",
that in some cases the court may properly declare it sufficient
as a matter of law, and in others may properly leave the question
to the jury. In this instance since the cross-examination revealed
some hostility of defendant's witnesses toward the plaintiff, the
question was properly for the jury. These cases seem to warrant
the statement that a presumption persists until the jury finds that
it has been overcome or until evidence has been introduced against
it which a jury must believe.

"181 Wash. 583, 591, 44 P. (2d) 808 (1935).
5186 Wash. 618, 59 P. (2d) 753 (1936).
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Although the Washington Court has frequently and recently
said that a presumption is not evidence, the minority in the Karp
ease insisted that the majority were in effect making the presumption operate as evidence that decedent used due care. The
exact question presented was this: In a case where the defendant
had the burden of proof upon the issue of decedent's negligence,
did the trial judge after instructing the jury that the decedent
was under a duty to yield the right of way to defendant commit
error by charging: "The law presumes that at the time and place
in question, and at this intersection, the deceased did yield the
right of way to the defendant. This, however, is merely a presumption and may be overcome by the evidence in this case to
the contrary, if there is such evidence, but it continues as a presumption until it has been overcome by the evidence in the case." 36
The majority assume that if Hoare's testimony did not destroy
the presumption, then it was proper so to charge the jury; otherwise, there was error. Upon this basis the opinion, as indicated
above, does seem to go further than any previous decision requires
it to go, for here was uncontradicted testimony of a disinterested
and unimpeached witness which, if true, necessarily established
that the presumed fact, due care, did not exist. Of course, it was
of such character that the jury did not have to believe it. Both
majority and minority say so. In previous cases where the presumption was held to be destroyed, it might well be argued that
the opposing testimony was such as the jury would be required
to believe; but certainly no such language was used. The talk
was all of testimony of disinterested witnesses or of interested
witnesses corroborated by that of disinterested witnesses. Still, it
would be difficult to assert that the majority opinion as to the
persistence of the presumption is necessarily contrary to any
previous decision, however much opposed it may be to the language
of some of them. Mr. Justice Beals in his dissent says the true
rule as to the effect of opposing evidence upon a presumption is
stated in excerpts which he quotes from Jones and Wigmore. The
quotation from Jones is like a lot of the material in the second
edition of that work. The first sentence declares that the presumption cannot stand in the face of facts. This nobody would deny,
no matter what his theory. The question is when do the facts
appear? The second sentence asserts that the presumption, "by
reason of the slightest rebutting evidence, topples utterly out of
consideration of the trier of facts. "37 This taken literally is law
s'181 Wash. 587 (1935).
37Id. 594.
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nowhere. Charitably interpreted it states Mr. Thayer's theory.
The quotation from Wigmore is an accurate restatement of Thayer's theory. But surely it cannot be contended that the Supreme
Court of Washington has in recent decisions accepted that theory.
The one thing that stands out in all of them is its repudiation of
that doctrine; and the previous Washington cases cited by the
minority require that the opposing evidence come from disinterested witnesses. Certainly, what ]r. Justice Beals declares to be
the true rule is farther from the recently accepted Washington
doctrine than the rule which the majority purport to apply.
Is the assumption of the majority right, that if the presumption
is not destroyed, the jury should be told about it? Certainly the
jury need not be told about the presumption in so far as its effect
is to put on the opponent the burden (1) to produce sufficient
evidence to avoid a directed verdict, or (2) to produce evidence
sufficient to persuade the jury that it was at least as probable as
not that Mrs. Karp did enter the highway without stopping, or
(3) to persuade the jury as to what she did -with reference to
yielding the right of way to the defendant, or (4) to persuade the
jury that she did not yield the right of way.
In Brown v. Henderson,8 the Massachusetts court had the-same
situation before it. The trial judge told the jury that the presumption of due care was not evidence, but controlled in the
absence of evidence: "When evidence is introduced then you are
to consider the evidence. If you believe the evidence the presumption disappears; but just because somebody has said something and
you do not believe a word of that evidence the presumption would
control." What he meant apparently was that if they disbelieved
the opposing evidence, the presumption would control. The Supreme Court said that this charge was right, in that it required.
the jury "to consider the evidence and to give weight to it only so
far as found to be true." Mfr. Justice Lummus in concurring,
said:
"A presumption is a rule of law which compels the conclusion
that a fact exists, in the absence of some required quantity of
evidence or degree of proof to the contrary. It is impossible to
weigh a rule of law, or to attribute to it persuasive force as evidence of fact. Therefore the opinion states what is now settled law
in rejecting the theory that a presumption is evidence. Upon
any other theory of presumptions that to his knowledge has ever
been advanced, a presumption can have no greater effect than to
control unless rebutted by proof to the contrary. Except for the
11285 Mass. 192, 194, 196, 189 N. E. 41 (1934).
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presumption of legitimacy, most authorities give a presumption
less effect. When the statute cast upon the defendant the burden
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, it did everything for the plaintiff that a presumption of his due care could do, and according to
most authorities on the subject of presumptions it did more. The
statutory presumption of due care, therefore, is wholly overshadowed by that burden of proof, and can have no practical effect.
If it never had been created, or should be abolished, neither party
would be a whit the better or the worse. The statutory presumption of due care is like a handkerchief thrown over something
covered by a blanket also . . . For this reason, if the burden of
proof is correctly stated to the jury, there can be no reversible
error in dealing with the presumption of due care, whether the
judge adopts what seems the better course of refusing to mention
it at all, or, as the judge did in this case, indulges in what must
needs be an academic discussion of its theoretical operation; and
this, no matter whether that discussion conforms to the true theory
of presumptions or not."
Here, then, is a case where the judges, trial and Supreme Court,
all agreed that a presumption is not evidence, and continued in
the particular case until overcome by evidence; and that it was
either right or not reversible error for the trial judge to tell the
jury about it, even though he had also rightly instructed, that the
burden of proof was upon the defendant, the party against whom
the presumption operated. In other words, the instruction did not
really increase the defendant's burden, for the same thing that
would satisfy the burden of proof would also overcome the presumption, and the jury could not help realize it.
The Supreme Court of Wyoming, however, would not agree
with Mr. Justice Lummus. It would probably agree with the trial
judge, for the Massachusetts statute created both the presumption
and the burden of proof and did it by separate provisions. The
Wyoming court believes that there should be a classification of presumptions; and that presumptions founded upon strong considerations of policy, when operating against the party otherwise having
the burden of proof, should be given additional weight. For this
latter proposition, it relies heavily upon a decision of the Supreme
9
Court of Washington. In Worth v. Worth, plaintiff sued her
husband's parents for damages for alienating his affections. Plaintiff, of course, had the burden of proving that the advice given the
husband by the defendants was given in bad faith. The court, in
48 Wyo. 441, 449, 460, 461, 49 P. (2d) 649 (1935).
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accord with most authorities, held that there was a presumption
that all such advice given by parents to their children was given
in good faith. The defendants requested the judge to instruct the
jury that there was such a presumption. He refused so to do but
did instruct correctly upon the burden of proof. The Supreme
Court after an elaborate discussion of presumptions, held this
refusal to be error but thought it unnecessary to determine whether
this error alone would be sufficient to cause reversal. In reaching
its result, it was greatly influenced by Cramer v. Cramer,40 wherein the Washington court quoted with approval a quotation by the
Supreme Court of Missouri from the opinion of an Iowa court:
"If defendant was entitled to the presumption of good faith, as
he was, its existence should not have been left to be felt out and
inferred by way of implication and argument by the jury, but it
should have been boldly and plainly declared." And for itself,
said: "If there is a presumption in favor of good faith carrying
its companion of a burden imposed upon him who assails it-and
there is-it is important the jury be so instructed. The appellants had a right to a direct and positive instruction upon this
matter."
The Wyoming court considered cases where it had been held
error to instruct the jury that a presumption was evidence and
had no fault to find with them. It did disagree with a Connecticut
case which expressed in different language the idea put forth by
Mr. Justice Lummnus, as to which it expressed the opinion:
"It is not, we think, quite correct to say that the 'presumption
only reiterates' the obligation of the burden of proof. An instruction that the burden to prove malice is on the plaintiff states the
duty resting on the latter. An instruction that the jury must
start out with the assumpion that the defendants were in good
faith states a benefit or privilege conferred upon the defendants
by the law. It at least makes that benefit clear and brings it home
to the jury-which, after all, is the one important point in a jury
trial. It is, in fact, a distinct thought which, particularly if pressed
home to the jury by counsel, may often be of value. And that it
should be of value is unquestionably the intent of the law. If what
is said in the Connecticut case is correct, it is apparent that the
presumption, created by law specially in favor of parties situated
as the defendants herein would, so far as the jury is concerned, be
but a phantom. It is hardly possible that a presumption such as
we are dealing with here can be of that nature. It is not a procedural rule; it is based upon reason; upon the strong love usual
4106 Wash. 681, 684, 683, 180 Pac. 915 (1919).
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in parents for their children ...

If our reasoning herein is faulty,

and logic requires that the presumption herein be considered as a
phantom, then . . . 'logic in law must to some extent be tempered

by considerations of public policy and justice.' . . . [The court
then cited cases holding that evidence of malice must be clear,
etc.]

Mr. Thayer . . . would say, when such expressions occur,

that the presumption is accompanied by a rule relating to the
weight of the evidence. Perhaps so. Nevertheless, reason dictates
that an important presumption, intended to benefit parents in a
material way, should not be kept hidden from the jury. The instruction on the burden of proof given herein was the ordinary
instruction on that subject. It put the case upon the exact level
of any other case. But the law puts it on a different level ...

We

think, therefore, that the requested instruction, or the fundamental ideas contained therein, should have been given to the
jury. '' 41
At least two courts, then, after thoroughly considering the
effect of charging upon a presumption, insist that so to charge is
not to give to the presumption the effect of evidence: it is merely
to call to the jury's attention the necessity of starting their consideration with a definite assumption: to put them clearly in the
mental attitude that the law requires. To be sure, the same attitude is really required by charging that the burden of proof is
on the opponent, but the language of the ordinary charge does not
impress this fact upon the jury. This view is like that of those
judges who insist upon a charge upon the presumption of innocence in criminal cases. When forced to articulate their reasons,
they say that it does away with the danger that the jury will begin
with an assumption against the defendant because he has been
indicted or otherwise formally charged with the offense for which
he is on trial.
Granting all this, it may be argued that the minority is right
in 'insisting with Jones: "It may well be regarded as dangerous
in any event to instruct laymen that a rule of law is to be considered by them as controlling, to some unstated degree, the weight
of particular evidence." '4 2 It is true that juries may not understand presumptions; but in the Karp case, the court said merely,
that the presumption continued only until overcome by the evidence. Consequently, the dispute resolves itself into several questions. In all cases where the presumption works against the party
having the burden of proof, should it operate really to increase
4148 Wyo. 460-461, 461-462 (1935).
"As quoted by Mr. Justice Beals, 181 Wash. 583, 595 (1935).
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his burden? Af the burden is not to be increased, is it wise to
bring sharply to the jury's attention the assumption with which
it must begin consideration of the issue? By so doing will the jury
not be led to believe that even a preponderance of the evidence
will not be enough to justify a finding of contributory negligence
in view of the presumption,- and that it is the intention of the
court to require more? On the first question, certainly most of
the authorities are with Mr. Justice Lummus. The considerations
which create the presumption and those that fix burden of persuasion are often identical; and should not have double force. On
the second, no cases directly in point have been found, but there
are numerous decisions wherein the courts have held that unnecessary and slightly inaccurate charges upon presumptions do not
constitute reversible error.
The foregoing analysis will not, however, explain Knutson v.
McMahan,43 decided June 25, 1936. The trial was-by the judge
without a jury. Mrs. Knutson-was struck and killed by defendant's automobile about seven-thirty o'clock-of a September evening, while she was crossing a street in Tacoma between intersections. She had succeeded in getting some five or six feet beyond
the center line of the street. There was no doubt that the trial
court was justified in finding defendant guilty, of negligence. Consequently, the decision turned upon his finding as to Mrs. Knutson's conduct, for he awarded damages to her executor. The Supreme Court said that Mrs. Knutson was guilty of negligence as
a matter of law when she attempted to cross between intersections
in violation of an ordinance of Tacoma, "but this does not defeat
a recovery unless such negligence materially contributed to the
accident."144 Thus far the majority and minority were in agreement. From this point on, the majority opinion is extremely difficult to understand and must be quoted in full: "It was her duty
to exercise care commensurate with the situation and keep a
lookout to avoid injury. Crowl v. West Coast Steel Ca., 109 Wash.
426, 186 Pac. 866. She having died shortly after the accident, it is
presumed that, even though she was crossing the street in violation
of the ordinance, she was doing so in the exercise of due care.
Karp v. Herder, 181 Wash. 583, 44 P. (2d) 808.
"The accident having happened west of the center line of
South I street, it is a proper inference that Mrs. Knutson, in the
exercise of reasonable care, would see the automobile coming from
the south and would do -what she could to avoid being struck by it.
"58 P. (2d) 1033 (1936).
" d. 186 Wasl. 518, 522, 58 P. (2d) 1035.

-
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Had the automobile passed east of the center line of the street,
as the appellants claim, the accident would not have happened.
Giving effect to the presumption that Mrs. Knutson exercised due
care, it necessarily follows that she was not guilty of contributory
negligence which materially contributed to the accident, even
though she was crossing the street between intersections." 5
The second sentence, for which the Karp case is cited, cannot be
taken literally, for it is the equivalent of saying: "It is presumed
that, even though she was guilty of negligence as a matter of law
in crossing the street, she was doing so in the exercise of due care."
What it must mean is that although she was guilty of negligence
as a matter of law in getting herself into the street between intersections, it is presumed that she exercised due care in attempting
to extricate herself from the position into which her negligent conduct had placed her and in keeping a lookout to avoid injury.
This seems to be indicated by the first sentence of the last paragraph. The second sentence of the last paragraph has nothing to
do with decedent's negligence unless it hints that Mrs. Knutson,
while west of the center line of the street, was not required to
keep as sharp a lookout for cars coming from the south as for cars
coming from the north. It seems merely to emphasize defendant's
negligence as a proximate cause of the accident. The last sentence
contains an amazing conclusion. If it means what it says, it means
that the presumption of due care requires a finding that MVrs.
Knutson's negligence did not materially contribute to cause her
injury. This in effect creates a new presumption, a presumption
that the negligence of a person killed in an accident was not a
contributing cause of the accident. For it must be true that a
person, having deliberately put himself in a position where it is
negligent for him to be, may, in spite of his very best effortsin spite of the very best efforts any reasonable man could makebe injured as the direct and immediate result of his original negligence which is continuing to operate. By taking precautions, he
may be able to prevent such previous conduct from operating as
a producing cause of injury. Accordingly, MA[rs. Knutson's efforts
after getting into the street, no matter how careful, could not so
insulate her original negligence as to require the trier of fact to
find no causal relation between it and her ensuing injury. Consequently, the Court's language, by compelling the trier to find lack
of contributing cause, gives an artificial force to the evidence concerning the accident; and this is the characteristic function of a
presumption. Of course, the language goes much farther than was
" 1d.
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necessary for the decision. The trial judge, in finding for the
plaintiff, had found by implication that Mrs. Knutson's negligence
did not contribute to cause her injury and death. The only question before the Supreme Court was whether he was justified in
reaching this result, not whether he was compelled to do so. The
Growl case, cited by the Court, was ample authority for affirming
the finding, unless the doctrine of Bredemeyer v. Johnson 8 is
disregarded and that of the Benso. 47 and Millspaug 48 cases is
reinstated. The Growl case makes it clear that under ordinary
circumstances the defendant in a negligence case has the burden
of proving not only that plaintiff was negligent but also that his
negligence was a contributing cause of the accident. The Benson
and Millspaugh cases, in which the injured persons were the plaintiffs, modified this rule by holding that where a plaintiff's conduct
in violation of a traffic law constitutes negligence per se, plaintiff
has the burden of proving that his negligence was not such a contributing cause. If these cases were still law, it might be argued
that in the Knutson case, the Court was raising a presumption on
the issue of causation in favor of the person killed in the accident. But in Brederneyer v. Johnson, the -court expressly overruled the Millspaugh case "in so far as it holds that the burden of
proof is on a plaintiff to show that negligence on his part is not
a proximate cause of the injury". The outcome of the Knutson
case, therefore, is quite consistent with previous decisions, but its
language can hardly fail to be a source of trouble and confusion.
This brief survey of some of the more recent Washington decisions shows them to reflect the confusion of the authorities in
general. This may be due to difficulties inherent in the subject.
Mr. Thayer begins his essay with a quotation from Alciatus, written three hundred years earlier, which freely translated is: "The
subject which we are about to explore is of great utility and in
daily use, but confused, almost inextricably. 4 9 Mr. Thayer's attempt to clarify it was almost completely futile; and, in my opinion, has served only to furnish a formula which many courts have
verbally adopted, few have understood, and fewer still have actually applied. He and his scholarly disciples, and far from scholarly imitators in editorial notes and hack writing, have really increased the difficulties of modern judges by attempting to furnish
a simple, theoretical solution to a complicated problem by the naive
4179 Wash. 225, 231, 36 P. (2d) 1062 (1934).
'Benson v. Anderson, 129 Wash. 19, 223 Pac. 1063 (1924).
'"Millspaugh v. Alert Transfer & Storage Co., 145 Wash. 111, 259 Pac.
22 (1927).
"THAYEB, A PRELIMIiNARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 313 (1898).
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device of ignoring the complications. When we canvass the various
situations and their respective consequences to which the courts
have commonly applied the term, "presumption", in a technical
sense, we realize that no system which gives to the term the same
legal significance in all of them can be rational. The considerations applicable when the birth of a child in wedlock is said to
raise a presumption that it is the offsprnig of the mother's husband
and those applicable when seven years' unexplained absence is
said to raise a presumption of death on the last instant of the seventh year are so completely dissimilar that to give to these presumptions precisely the same procedural effect would call for
extended explanation. How, then, could such brilliant scholars and
sound thinkers as Thayer and Wigmore advocate such a result?
They must have known that in some situations the courts had
said a presumption was so strong that it could be overcome only
by clear and convincing evidence, in others of such strength that
it could be destroyed by a preponderance of evidence, and in still
others so weak as to give way before the mere introduction of evidence of a prescribed quantity and quality. Of course, they knew it,
but they evaded the difficulty by inventing, without expressly so
stating, a new vocabulary. Though the courts described the situation, process, or result, as a presumption, or the creation or operation of a presumption, properly speaking within the new vocabulary the presumption operated to put upon the opponent the burden of producing sufficient evidence against the presumed fact to
avoid a directed verdict; only this and nothing more. Whatever
additional effect was given was due to the operation of some other
legal concept. The courts were in some respects dealing with a
presumption as the physicists had formerly dealt with an atom,
as an indivisible unit. But by proper treatment, as the atom may
be broken into alpha, beta, and gamma particles, so what the
courts called a presumption should be broken up. That term, presumption, should be applied only to the alpha particle, the sole
function of which is to put upon the opponent the burden of introducing sufficient evidence to avoid a directed verdict. If any particular presumption has been said by the courts to have one or
more additional consequences, these are due to beta, gamma, or
other particles of the presumption, miscalled "presumption" by
those courts. The new terminology substitutes the term, presumption, for the alpha particle; and leaves the other particles nameless. It leaves them nameless, for the reason that we are trying
merely to clear up the subject of presumptions. We can clear it
up only by simplifying it; we can simplify it by casting out the
complications and either destroying them or putting them in an-
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other subject. Mr. Thayer was too wise to suppose that he could
destroy them. Consequently, he put them in another field; and
that field he did not seek to simplify; in so far as he dealt with
it, he merely divided it into those separate subjects of the substantive law with the facts of which the presumption was concerned. It does seem rather obvious that the utmost that this
technique can accomplish is to establish a convenient vocabulary
for discussion. For example, let it be agreed that whenever we
speak of a presumption, we are speaking only of that judicial
device which so operates that upon the establishment of A, the
party who is insisting upon the non-existence of B, shall have the
burden of introducing evidence which would justify a jury in finding the non-existence of B. Then, when we are discussing the
effect of the establishment of the fact of the birth of X, while X's
mother was the wife of Y, we shall know that it raises a presumption that X is the legitimate son of Y. But unless we are ignorant
of all the authorities, we shall know that it does much more than
that. Now, what shall we call that device which gives it additional effect? A rule of substantive law of domestic relations or
of property which fixes the burden of persuasion and the measure
of persuasion? If so, in what way has that helped the lawyer or
the judge? It has given him a new method of expressing the result. It has given him' not the slightest aid in reaching the result.
In wrongful death cases the courts have used the term presumption to express the effect to be given in a lawsuit to the fact that
decedent met his death by accident upon the issue of decedent's
due care or neglignce. It seems naive to the point of foolishness
to suppose that the courts first decided that there was a presumption of due care and then by consulting dictionaries, text-writers,
words and phrases judicially interpreted, and other lexicographic
sources, determined the meaning of presumption. If that were the
process, then the courts must have consisted of mere mechanical
jurists. Giving them credit for proceeding with ordinary judicial
competence, they must have tried to decide just what effect the
decedent's death was to be given in the process of determining
the quality of his conduct. Death has removed him as a witness,
and the love of life will ordinarily impel a person to look out for
his own safety. In view of these considerations, should the defendant be required to produce (1) evidence of decedent's negligence
sufficient to raise an issue for the jury, or (2) evidence of that
quantity and quality from disinterested sources, or (3) evidence
of that quality and quantity which the trier of fact actually believes, or (4) such evidence which will put in equilibrium the
mind of a trier who starts with the assumption of due care, or
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(5) such evidence as will convince the trier of decedent's negligence, or (6) such evidence as will produce some intermediate
effect? If the defendant already has the burden of persuasion,
should these circumstances operate to increase his burden, and
should the trier be so informed in the inaccurate language which
characterizes a presumption as evidence or in more accurate language which merely emphasizes the effect of these circumstances?
In answering these questions, no definition of presumption, technical or otherwise, can be of any assistance. In so far as precedents
are persuasive, the definitions which other courts used in similar
situations will make clear their opinions, and enable the instant
court to determine what effect has elsewhere been given to the same
facts. The question fundamentally is not one of terminology but
one the decision of which is to be made upon considerations of
fairness, convenience, and sound social policy. These considerations must be weighed in the light of what every judge and lawyer
knows: that our adversary system of administering justice provides
a very crude machine from the operation of which we can expect
only approximately accurate results at best, and in the operation
of which it is useless to attempt to apply meticulously nice rules,
requiring the capacity for keen intellectual distinctions. Such
admirable processes and capacities may be used to the utmost in
framing rules of substantive law and rules of procedure. But the
rules of procedure when framed must be so simple and easily
understandable as to be capable of ready apprehension and easy
application by ordinary minds.
Since the rules as to presumptions must be applied by the trial
judge in the heat and hurry of the trial, will it be practicable to
classify presumptions and assign to each an effect dependent
upon the considerations which caused the courts to create it? If
such classification were made by statute with an enumeration of
all presumptions, this might work. If most presumptions were to
be given a specified effect and only a few another effect, it might
be practicable. With the present confusion, in the authorities,
however, any attempt at a statutory codification would be fanciful.
What of an attempt to simplify by statute? The role which presumptions are theoretically deemed to play in actual litigation is
almost negligible when compared with the confusion, uncertainty,
and opportunities for error and alleged error which they create.
In some classes of litigation by resort to them as a device for either
taking a question from the jury or putting a question into the
province of the jury, the result of a lawsuit is determined. If a
court has become convinced that good policy requires that a particular issue should be tried by the judge or by the jury, and the
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device of presumption is taken away, judicial ingenuity will soon
invent a new one. And outside this use of presumption, the confusion could be cleared away, it is suggested, without harm to
courts, clients, or lawyers by a statute enacting a rule similar to
the common law rule of Pennsylvania-that the sole effect of a
presumption is to put upon the opponent the so-called burden
of proof, in the double sense of producing evidence and of persuading the jury that the presumed fact did not exist. This would
make it unnecessary ever to mention the presumption to the jury,
and would be very easy of application by the trial judge. To be
sure, it would be arbitrary, but it would abolish the prevailing
confusion and complexities. It seems to have worked reasonably
well in Pennsylvania, and may be worth a trial in Washington.

